This blog further examines the political aspects of the initiative campaign and highlights some of the poor decisions of the Yes campaign and its supporters that directly led to its defeat. I will also look forward to potentially more viable approaches.
Some additional information
Recently, CarbonWashington made the precinct map for 1631 available (see below) and it tells an interesting story. The initiative lost in a major way (less than 20% support) in the red/orange areas, which includes much of eastern WA and in SW Washington. The initiative was also defeated in the green and yellow areas.
(click on figure to enlarge)
It is also interesting to see the change in support between 1631 and the previous initiative (732), which was designed to be revenue neutral (to give back all the collected carbon tax). Red and yellow indicate loss of support between 732 and 1631, something that was evident in many of the rural areas of the state. In contrast, in the tribal areas, urban cores (Seattle, Bellingham), and wealthy retirement areas (e.g., Port Townsend) support increased (light and dark blue). In short, outside of the tribal regions, there was a clear divide between urban and rural, wealthy and lower income.
Some Political Observations
An essential fact
Passing 1631, and really any carbon tax or fee, is a very heavy lift, particularly if it is not revenue neutral (gives back all or most of the money). Although the majority of the U.S. population has concerns about human-caused climate change, very few are willing to sacrifice significantly to do anything about it. This is not speculation: numerous polls show that most people do not see global warming as a major issue for their immediate lives and are not willing to spend much to deal with it (100-200 dollars a year at most, according to one study, $5 per energy bill says another). Very few folks are willing to restrict their life styles in a meaningful way to slow the increase of greenhouse gases. For example, my climate researcher colleagues at the UW have the worst carbon footprints imaginable and are not willing to reduce their intensive use of air travel for work or pleasure. Many of the most passionate 1631 advocates are avid travelers. If people who have an intimate knowledge of the problem won't sacrifice, it is doubtful many others will.
Thus, an initiative that costs the average person a few hundred dollars in the first year and escalates to much more within a decade is not something many people will support. Relatively well-off climate activists forget that many people are near the financial edge and that carbon fee costs can be a real burden for them (a recent study found that 4 in 10 folks could not come up with $400 in an emergency).
Obvious deceptions don't work
The pro-1631 folks undoubtedly knew the above and deliberately tried to deceive the electorate about the proposal. The initiative title or descriptive language did not talk about dealing with anthropogenic global warming--supposedly the real intent of the sponsors-- but highlighted clean air, water, and healthy communities. Who could be against clean air? Unfortunately, that is not what the initiative was about.
Here is the exact language of the initiative:
"AN ACT Relating to reducing pollution by investing in clean air, clean energy, clean water, healthy forests, and healthy communities by imposing a fee on large emitters based on their pollution"
Nothing about global warming. Even a superficial reading of the initiative made clear that it did not address clean water and did little about clean air. The key winter air pollution problem in the State has been pollution from burning wood, which 1631 did not address. And much of the summer air quality problems in the State came from wildfires in BC, Oregon, and CA, which the initiative would not influence. Even worse, the bill did not provide the major resources needed to reduce the threat of wildfires in WA State (e.g., massive thinning and prescribed burning that would cost hundreds of millions of dollars per year to really address the problem).
The deceptions were even worse that that.... the 1631 advocates suggested that WA citizens would not pay the cost, but rather the polluters would. This claim was explicitly stated in flyers the 1631 folks sent around (see below) and in their web/tv advertising.
Many (most) voters could see through the 1631 subterfuge and understood that oil companies and others would pass the costs on to them. People laughed at the lines about "big polluters would pay" and the initiative lost much credibility.
Regressive Fee That Would Hurt Low-Income Citizens
One of the major problems with the I-1631 initiative was that its carbon fee would be highly regressive, preferentially hurting lower-income and working-class residents of our state. Realistic estimates of the I-1631 carbon fee suggested it would cost the average resident a few hundred dollars a year to start, increasing to 500-1000 dollars a year after a decade. Such costs more heavily weigh on low income residents, since the carbon fee would be a far higher percentage of their annual incomes. Farm workers and building trades folks, who often commute long distances, would be particularly hurt, and they knew it. And thus low-income and disadvantaged groups opposed I-1631.
Calling Oil Companies Names Has Little Traction Among Most Voters
As the election approached, the Yes on 1631 campaign made a tactical decision to go negative, with the majority of their online and on-air ads attacking "big oil" in one way or another. Some accused "Big Oil" of polluting the environment, otherwise accused the oil companies of buying the election, or of some form of lying/deception.
Now many people are worried about human-caused climate change, but they also understood that the oil companies are not necessarily villains. They supply a product that many people want and need at a reasonable price. Going negative and painting the industry as bad people was not an effective motivator. And hardly a good way to get them to join as partners.
But it is worse than that. Some 1631 supporters actually broke the law, defacing No-on-1631 signs throughout the state by putting on "Big Oil" stickers (see below). This was done on a massive scale on thousands of signs and was clearly organized and paid for by some kind of state-wide organization.
Many folks, including some very progressive voters, were outraged by this action. And the Yes on 1631 deceptions did not end there. Late in the campaign, they accused the No campaign of listing false endorsements in campaign flyers. These attacks were easily disproven by signed endorsement forms provided by the No campaign.
The truth about initiative spending
One of the major claims of Yes on 1631 campaign was that the oil companies were "buying" the election and were crushing the "grass roots" support for 1631. In reality, the two campaigns were nearly evenly matched in terms of resources. According to the Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, the No campaign spent 31 million and the Yes expended 16 million. 16 million is a huge amount of money to spend on an initiative (tied for the second largest in State history to support an initiative) and clearly the Yes campaign had plenty of money to get out their message--something confirmed by a polling group hired by the Yes campaign.
Both sides saturated the airways and the web, and quite honestly both past the point of diminishing returns. Furthermore, while the No campaign efforts were pretty much limited to the 31 million noted above, the Yes campaign also included a number of organizations that did their own campaign /communication efforts (such as Seattle-based Climate Solutions), the value of which was in the millions of dollars. In short, both sides had more than sufficient resources to make their cases and claims that the oil companies won by spending more money is simply untrue. 1631 lost because it was flawed and unpopular, not because the supporters were outspent.
1631 failed to provide a concrete plan and would be directed by a non-elected partisan committee
One of the great weaknesses of 1631 was that it offered no specific plans or projects. The money would go into very general bins and the decisions on how to spend the money was left to a board selected by the Governor. Clearly, the board was going to be highly partisan and there was no guarantee that substantial funds would be spent on critical projects (like a massive thinning of the east-side forests), rather than political show pieces. Most people were uncomfortable with this approach, as were the editorial boards of major newspapers (e.g., the Seattle Times).
What Next?
The failure of two initiative attempts at carbon pricing is highly damaging and undermines the chances of securing some reasonable measure in our state. Thus, the supporters of 1631, many of which had opposed initiative 732, bear a serious responsibility for lack of action on climate in our state. Their opposition killed the bipartisan 732, which would have returned all carbon fees to state residents. Then they pushed a highly partisan 1631 that was highly regressive, essentially undemocratic, and which distributed funds through an unelected committee, with no concrete goals and no real measures of success. And the inevitable result was failure.
Clearly, it would be best if our state legislators took up this issue in a responsible way, crafting a bipartisan bill that would help our state move to lessen our greenhouse gas emissions.
From my own study of the issue, going to many meetings, and talking with a lot of the players, my own feeling is that there are two viable approaches to establishing a carbon tax/fee that could meet popular approval and act as an efficient motivator to reduce carbon usage, while encouraging new energy technologies.
The first is a revenue-neutral carbon fee and dividend. In this approach, a fee on carbon would be collected, but all the revenue would be returned to state residents in the form of a dividend, with every taxpayer receiving the same amount. Since wealthy people have a bigger carbon footprint and would pay more of a fee, net funds would be transferred to low income folks, making our tax system LESS regressive. No carbon fee would be collected from export-sensitive industries. Lower income and working-class folks would not be hurt.
Many Republicans and moderates are ready to support such a carbon fee and dividend, and I believe several of the oil companies that were against 1631 would SUPPORT such an approach. We could do something bipartisan that would be an example for the nation.
The second approach would be a hybrid. A carbon fee would be collected, but only part of it returned, with the rest going to critical, specified projects. A substantial proportion (say 50%) of the fee would be returned in the form of a dividend, particularly to ensure that low-income and working class folks are not hurt. The remainder of the funds could go to SPECIFIED projects like repairing our forests (which would reduce catastrophic wildfires and improve air quality), speeding up installation or extending rail, or in resilience/adaptation projects (such as building new reservoirs to ensure enough water now and in the future).
For many reasons, 1631 was a debacle, a partisan attempt to secure funding for the projects of some favored groups. A warning about what happens when folks lose sight of the need for concrete, coherent action on climate change and forget about the precarious financial status of our state's less advantaged citizens.
As noted above, there is the potential for moving to effective, bi-partisan approaches (such as the carbon fee and divided) that could provide an example to the nation. We can do this.
_______________________________
Personal Note:
My opposition to 1631 has resulted in my being demonized by activists, being called terrible names (e.g., racist, climate denier) and accused of being an agent of "big oil". What I have learned is that some folks are so convinced they are saving the world and so self-righteous, that they feel that they can hurt other people, call names, and even do illegal acts. They are even willing to undermine the underpinning of our democracy (like tolerance for others and free speech) to get their way. Tragically, some of the worst abusers of free speech are found at a public institution, in the College of the Environment at the University of Washington, a place where tolerance of a diversity of ideas should be celebrated.
Some Political Observations
An essential fact
Passing 1631, and really any carbon tax or fee, is a very heavy lift, particularly if it is not revenue neutral (gives back all or most of the money). Although the majority of the U.S. population has concerns about human-caused climate change, very few are willing to sacrifice significantly to do anything about it. This is not speculation: numerous polls show that most people do not see global warming as a major issue for their immediate lives and are not willing to spend much to deal with it (100-200 dollars a year at most, according to one study, $5 per energy bill says another). Very few folks are willing to restrict their life styles in a meaningful way to slow the increase of greenhouse gases. For example, my climate researcher colleagues at the UW have the worst carbon footprints imaginable and are not willing to reduce their intensive use of air travel for work or pleasure. Many of the most passionate 1631 advocates are avid travelers. If people who have an intimate knowledge of the problem won't sacrifice, it is doubtful many others will.
Thus, an initiative that costs the average person a few hundred dollars in the first year and escalates to much more within a decade is not something many people will support. Relatively well-off climate activists forget that many people are near the financial edge and that carbon fee costs can be a real burden for them (a recent study found that 4 in 10 folks could not come up with $400 in an emergency).
Obvious deceptions don't work
The pro-1631 folks undoubtedly knew the above and deliberately tried to deceive the electorate about the proposal. The initiative title or descriptive language did not talk about dealing with anthropogenic global warming--supposedly the real intent of the sponsors-- but highlighted clean air, water, and healthy communities. Who could be against clean air? Unfortunately, that is not what the initiative was about.
Here is the exact language of the initiative:
"AN ACT Relating to reducing pollution by investing in clean air, clean energy, clean water, healthy forests, and healthy communities by imposing a fee on large emitters based on their pollution"
Nothing about global warming. Even a superficial reading of the initiative made clear that it did not address clean water and did little about clean air. The key winter air pollution problem in the State has been pollution from burning wood, which 1631 did not address. And much of the summer air quality problems in the State came from wildfires in BC, Oregon, and CA, which the initiative would not influence. Even worse, the bill did not provide the major resources needed to reduce the threat of wildfires in WA State (e.g., massive thinning and prescribed burning that would cost hundreds of millions of dollars per year to really address the problem).
The deceptions were even worse that that.... the 1631 advocates suggested that WA citizens would not pay the cost, but rather the polluters would. This claim was explicitly stated in flyers the 1631 folks sent around (see below) and in their web/tv advertising.
Many (most) voters could see through the 1631 subterfuge and understood that oil companies and others would pass the costs on to them. People laughed at the lines about "big polluters would pay" and the initiative lost much credibility.
Regressive Fee That Would Hurt Low-Income Citizens
One of the major problems with the I-1631 initiative was that its carbon fee would be highly regressive, preferentially hurting lower-income and working-class residents of our state. Realistic estimates of the I-1631 carbon fee suggested it would cost the average resident a few hundred dollars a year to start, increasing to 500-1000 dollars a year after a decade. Such costs more heavily weigh on low income residents, since the carbon fee would be a far higher percentage of their annual incomes. Farm workers and building trades folks, who often commute long distances, would be particularly hurt, and they knew it. And thus low-income and disadvantaged groups opposed I-1631.
A regressive tax is a tax imposed in such a manner that the average tax rate (tax paid ÷ personal income) decreases as the amount subject to taxation increases
I-1631 supporters, many of which enjoy relatively high incomes, did not take this issue seriously, suggesting that some vague aspects of the initiative would help poor residents, such as calling for 15% of the fee being used to help lower-income people. But nothing was specified and decisions would be made by an unelected board. My analysis, as noted above and my previous blog, suggests that low income and minority groups (e.g., Hispanic folks) were overwhelmingly against 1631. Many of the Seattle-based, social activist groups, for all their talk, did not really represent the minority folks and low-income individuals they claimed to speak for.Calling Oil Companies Names Has Little Traction Among Most Voters
As the election approached, the Yes on 1631 campaign made a tactical decision to go negative, with the majority of their online and on-air ads attacking "big oil" in one way or another. Some accused "Big Oil" of polluting the environment, otherwise accused the oil companies of buying the election, or of some form of lying/deception.
Now many people are worried about human-caused climate change, but they also understood that the oil companies are not necessarily villains. They supply a product that many people want and need at a reasonable price. Going negative and painting the industry as bad people was not an effective motivator. And hardly a good way to get them to join as partners.
But it is worse than that. Some 1631 supporters actually broke the law, defacing No-on-1631 signs throughout the state by putting on "Big Oil" stickers (see below). This was done on a massive scale on thousands of signs and was clearly organized and paid for by some kind of state-wide organization.
Many folks, including some very progressive voters, were outraged by this action. And the Yes on 1631 deceptions did not end there. Late in the campaign, they accused the No campaign of listing false endorsements in campaign flyers. These attacks were easily disproven by signed endorsement forms provided by the No campaign.
The truth about initiative spending
One of the major claims of Yes on 1631 campaign was that the oil companies were "buying" the election and were crushing the "grass roots" support for 1631. In reality, the two campaigns were nearly evenly matched in terms of resources. According to the Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, the No campaign spent 31 million and the Yes expended 16 million. 16 million is a huge amount of money to spend on an initiative (tied for the second largest in State history to support an initiative) and clearly the Yes campaign had plenty of money to get out their message--something confirmed by a polling group hired by the Yes campaign.
Both sides saturated the airways and the web, and quite honestly both past the point of diminishing returns. Furthermore, while the No campaign efforts were pretty much limited to the 31 million noted above, the Yes campaign also included a number of organizations that did their own campaign /communication efforts (such as Seattle-based Climate Solutions), the value of which was in the millions of dollars. In short, both sides had more than sufficient resources to make their cases and claims that the oil companies won by spending more money is simply untrue. 1631 lost because it was flawed and unpopular, not because the supporters were outspent.
1631 failed to provide a concrete plan and would be directed by a non-elected partisan committee
One of the great weaknesses of 1631 was that it offered no specific plans or projects. The money would go into very general bins and the decisions on how to spend the money was left to a board selected by the Governor. Clearly, the board was going to be highly partisan and there was no guarantee that substantial funds would be spent on critical projects (like a massive thinning of the east-side forests), rather than political show pieces. Most people were uncomfortable with this approach, as were the editorial boards of major newspapers (e.g., the Seattle Times).
What Next?
The failure of two initiative attempts at carbon pricing is highly damaging and undermines the chances of securing some reasonable measure in our state. Thus, the supporters of 1631, many of which had opposed initiative 732, bear a serious responsibility for lack of action on climate in our state. Their opposition killed the bipartisan 732, which would have returned all carbon fees to state residents. Then they pushed a highly partisan 1631 that was highly regressive, essentially undemocratic, and which distributed funds through an unelected committee, with no concrete goals and no real measures of success. And the inevitable result was failure.
Clearly, it would be best if our state legislators took up this issue in a responsible way, crafting a bipartisan bill that would help our state move to lessen our greenhouse gas emissions.
From my own study of the issue, going to many meetings, and talking with a lot of the players, my own feeling is that there are two viable approaches to establishing a carbon tax/fee that could meet popular approval and act as an efficient motivator to reduce carbon usage, while encouraging new energy technologies.
The first is a revenue-neutral carbon fee and dividend. In this approach, a fee on carbon would be collected, but all the revenue would be returned to state residents in the form of a dividend, with every taxpayer receiving the same amount. Since wealthy people have a bigger carbon footprint and would pay more of a fee, net funds would be transferred to low income folks, making our tax system LESS regressive. No carbon fee would be collected from export-sensitive industries. Lower income and working-class folks would not be hurt.
Many Republicans and moderates are ready to support such a carbon fee and dividend, and I believe several of the oil companies that were against 1631 would SUPPORT such an approach. We could do something bipartisan that would be an example for the nation.
The second approach would be a hybrid. A carbon fee would be collected, but only part of it returned, with the rest going to critical, specified projects. A substantial proportion (say 50%) of the fee would be returned in the form of a dividend, particularly to ensure that low-income and working class folks are not hurt. The remainder of the funds could go to SPECIFIED projects like repairing our forests (which would reduce catastrophic wildfires and improve air quality), speeding up installation or extending rail, or in resilience/adaptation projects (such as building new reservoirs to ensure enough water now and in the future).
For many reasons, 1631 was a debacle, a partisan attempt to secure funding for the projects of some favored groups. A warning about what happens when folks lose sight of the need for concrete, coherent action on climate change and forget about the precarious financial status of our state's less advantaged citizens.
As noted above, there is the potential for moving to effective, bi-partisan approaches (such as the carbon fee and divided) that could provide an example to the nation. We can do this.
_______________________________
Personal Note:
My opposition to 1631 has resulted in my being demonized by activists, being called terrible names (e.g., racist, climate denier) and accused of being an agent of "big oil". What I have learned is that some folks are so convinced they are saving the world and so self-righteous, that they feel that they can hurt other people, call names, and even do illegal acts. They are even willing to undermine the underpinning of our democracy (like tolerance for others and free speech) to get their way. Tragically, some of the worst abusers of free speech are found at a public institution, in the College of the Environment at the University of Washington, a place where tolerance of a diversity of ideas should be celebrated.
from Cliff Mass Weather and Climate Blog https://cliffmass.blogspot.com/2019/03/lessons-of-failure-of-initiative-1631.html
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